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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The world of policy making and implementation seems to be full of networks.  Indeed, 
empirical evidence indicates that governments across the world are looking for new forms of 
governance to cope with the network character of policy formation and implementation 
(Marin/Mayentz, 1991; Marsh/Rhodes, 1992; Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan, 1997; Osborne, 2000;  
Marcussen/Torfing, 2006) 
 
The growing trend toward partnerships and networks as vehicles to achieve policy outcomes 
and organise service delivery has been connected by many authors to the development of a 
‘network society’. Interdependence and horizontal relations have grown in importance, partly 
as a consequence of information technologies. They are also the consequence of increased 
specialization (Castells, 2000). Indeed, it seems likely the policies of new public management, 
in which specific policy implementation tasks are outsourced or autonomized, have 
exacerbated this trend (Rhodes, 1997).Castells (2000) argues that our societies are increasingly 
formed in the bi-polar tension between the net and the self . If we look at his analysis, the 
development towards a network society has been a gradual progression which started 
somewhere in the 1970s, but which accelerated during the final decade of the twentieth century. 
The implicit assumption, if we accept this analysis, is that there is a growing need for inter-
organizational structures between organizations to deal with the growing complexity of 
interactions in the public and private sphere (and at the interfaces between those spheres) . 
 
Other societal trends have been linked to these developments. Individualization, considered as 
one of the major societal developments in western society (eg Bauman, 2000; Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim, 2001; Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau 2000) brings about a greater variety of values. 
It goes hand in hand with a diminishing of the importance of traditional societal relations (see 
also Putnam’s conclusions on the disappearance of social capital (Putnam 1995; 2000). The 
move towards a network society makes our society less governable, not only because resources 
are divided, but also because there is no undisputed set of values against which to judge policy 
proposals and outcomes.  
 
Neither Castells, nor other commentators systematically explore what these changes in society 
mean for the role of government or, more particularly, processes of governance. There are 
however a few obvious effects which have been suggested by several authors. First, extended 
(international) networks will create conditions and pressures that are often beyond the reach of 
national governments. The tension between the ‘net and the self’ would lead both to a 
diminishing importance of classical binding mechanisms and groups (political parties, all kinds 
of intermediate, traditional organisation), and to the emergence of new more ad hoc (social) 
movements of citizens. We would also witness a more critical attitude towards public 
authorities and their policy proposals. Such scenarios have led policy practitioners and scholars 
to seek new forms of governance which connect citizens’ groups and societal actors to public 
policy, and thus create the necessary support that is failing as a consequence of the diminishing 
connections between citizens and traditional organisations (parties, societal organisations). Such 
strategies would also provide governmental actors with a means to acquire more information 
and knowledge from societal actors (for this complementary assumption against other 
assumptions: Klijn/Skelcher, 2007) 
 
While these predictions remain very hard to prove,  the growing number of (international) 
strategic alliances between firms (Faulkner 1995), the attention to chain management and 
networks of firms (Graeber 1993), the growing attention (at least rhetorical) to forms of co-
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governance and Public Private Partnerships (Osborne 2000; Pollitt 2003) indicate that they 
should be taken seriously. This is evident from the struggles of both governments and firms to 
find new ways to cope with changing features of their environments. 
 
Networks as governance mechanism: the need for network management! 
In order to solve the complex policy problems governments face, it is necessary to involve 
various actors in policy-making and implementation processes. Private actors, social 
alignments, and citizens, have either important resources or the power to obstruct policy 
interventions. Therefore it is only through joint efforts and collaborative action that policy 
problems in a modern society can be solved.  
 
The idea that the formation and implementation of policy or service delivery to citizens takes 
place in a network of organisations is certainly not novel. Early inter-organisational theorists 
like Levine and White (1961), Emerson (1962) and Litwak and Hylton (1962) stressed the 
interdependencies of organisations in realizing interesting outcomes. Mapping the interactions 
of organisations very soon became an accepted way to analyse policy processes and service 
delivery (Aldrich, 1979; Aldrich/Whetten, 1981). In political science authors like Dahl and 
others focused attention on the networks of elite actors that were involved in policy making 
(Dahl, 1961). This resulted in the famous debate between pluralists and elitists about how 
power was divided in policy making and society more generally. In Public Administration 
however these early theories had almost no impact at all. 
 
The recognition of the fragmentation of power – authority, resource and control - was 
reflected in the late 70s, in one of the seminal contributions on network decision-making 
(Hanf and Scharpf, 1978). It has the telling title: ‘Inter-organisational policy making: Limits 
to coordination and central control’. Scharpf remarks at the end: “It is unlikely, if not 
impossible, that public policy of any significance could result from the choice process of any 
single unified actor. Policy formation and policy implementation are inevitably the result of 
interactions among a plurality of separate actors with separate interests, goals, and strategies” 
(Scharpf 1978: 346). According to Scharpf, research should not only be directed towards 
specific interactions between organizations and the strategic interactions that form policy and 
implementation, but also to the set of stable relations between organizations. Scharpf finds his 
theoretical inspiration not only in theories of dependency relations but also in public choice 
theory and theories of complex decision-making. 
 
Two important observations can be made about the development of this line of thinking. First, 
although the concept network was known and used in organisational and political theories, it 
was not a very prominent concept in the 60s and 70s in general, and certainly not in Public 
Administration. One would not find any attention to it in the standard handbooks on public 
policy, or public administration at this time. It was not until the 80s that the concept grew in 
popularity when it was used to analyse policy-making processes and implementation 
processes. The second observation is that the recent literature on networks as a governance 
mechanism has paid explicit attention to the managerial question: how can we guide and steer 
these complex interaction processes. This question went largely unasked in the earlier 
political science literature. The recent attention to management or governance of complex 
networks has both empirical relevance (research is being done what management strategies do 
occur and what their effect is), as well as prescriptive relevance (what strategies should we 
use to be effective in governance networks) 
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Structure of this chapter 
 
In this chapter an overview of the research using the network concept to analyse policy 
making and implementation is presented. In section 2 the three main research traditions that 
have used the network concept as a tool for analysing policy making and implementation are 
briefly discussed. The traditions are compared and it is shown that they have recently tended 
to converge. In section 3 the focus shifts to what the literature has to tell us about managing 
networks and the complex decision-making processes that take place within them. In section 5  
the question of how to research networks of policy making and implementation is considered. 
Finally, the chapter is concluded with some observations about the future of this research 
tradition. 
 
 
2. POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION NETWORKS: AN OVERVIEW 
 
The range of network types that have been studied from a network perspective is enormous 
and recently there seems to be a global explosion of research on policy and implementation 
networks. We can only present a brief overview of some main findings and trends using a 
classification of the research from a network perspective on policy formation and 
implementation.  
 
Three types of networks compared 
Although it may be the case that every classification is arbitrary, given the various research 
traditions and the history of the field, it is nevertheless possible to distinguish between three 
different types of research focusing on different types of networks. Each is rooted in a 
different theoretical tradition. The three research traditions concerning policy and 
implementation networks (Table 5.1) are: 
- Research on policy networks; this is strongly based on a political science tradition 
which focuses on which actors participate in decisions in policy networks and 
which actors have power and access for decision-making. This research can be 
traced back to the famous discussions on power in the 60s and continued to be 
adopted in British research on policy communities and networks in the 80s and 
90s. 
- Research on inter-organisational service delivery and implementation of policy; 
this research starts more from an inter-organisational perspective and strongly 
focuses on networks as vehicles for service delivery and implementation. It is the 
coordination and creation of concrete products and outcomes which is central. It is 
not surprising that this research tradition also focuses more upon the construction 
of networks that can and do organise joint service delivery or policy 
implementation 
- Research on governance networks; this research corresponds more to the public 
administration tradition and strongly stresses the complexity of decision-making to 
achieve policy outcomes. It focuses more upon existing networks around policy 
initiatives and implementation. It is also concerned with the deliberation process 
between actors, such as the possible outcomes and value conflicts that are at stake 
when actors try to achieve workable solutions for policy problems. More than in 
the other two research traditions, the authors assume that governance processes in 
networks are a consequence of, and tied to, modern network society. 
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This chapter emphasises governance networks both because this literature is more recent and 
because other traditions are addressed in other chapters (see the chapter of Brint Milward on 
service partnerships (chapter 6), the chapter of David Knoke op political science perspective 
(chapter 19) and the chapter of Mike Geddes on local and regional partnerships (chapter 8). 
 
5.1. Types of networks in empirical research and their characteristics 
 Policy networks Service delivery and 
implementation 
Governance networks 
Main origin Political science Organisational science/inter-
organisation theory 
Public administration 
Focus decision making and effects 
closure and power relations 
on issue and agenda setting 
 
Inter-organisational 
coordination 
Effective policy/service 
delivery 
Integrated policy/services 
solving societal problems 
managing horizontal 
governance relations 
connecting governance 
networks to traditional 
institutions 
deliberation processes 
Main fields and research 
questions 
Which actors are involved in 
decision-making 
How are the power relations 
and what are the effects on 
decision-making 
  
How can complex integrated 
services be coordinated 
What mechanisms are 
effective and efficient 
(contracting, partnerships 
etc) 
 
how to mange governance 
networks 
how to organise them and 
connect them to traditional 
institutions 
how to improve variety of 
content and combine various 
value judgements 
History 
 
Starts with the pluralist 
political science research of 
the 60s and continues 
through to research on 
subsystems,  policy 
communities and policy 
networks 
Starts with the first inter-
organisational theorists that 
focus on inter-organisational 
coordination and continues 
through to research on 
service delivery (also 
through contracting) and 
implementation 
Starts in the mid 70s with 
work on inter-governmental 
relations (Hanf/Scharpf, 
1978) and continues with 
analyses of  new governance 
forms and their effects and 
management requirements 
 
The three traditions have been combined more and more over the course of time. While they 
originate from different sources and different research traditions, they seemed to have 
converged as researchers have freely adopted different elements from the different traditions. 
 
Policy networks: policy making in tight coupled networks 
Research on policy networks has a substantial history. It was built on a rich tradition of 
political science research which has focused upon the influence of interest groups on decision-
making, the process of agenda building, the entrance of actors in that process (Cobb/Elder, 
1983) and the opportunities (policy windows, see Kingdon, 1984) that occur in these 
processes. 
Studies reported in this network literature over the last twenty years, reveal strong interactions 
between actors in specific policy domains. This generalization holds for studies which use 
quantitative techniques for mapping interactions (see Laumann and Knoke 1987 for one of the 
best examples) and for studies which use case studies to compare and analyse different 
networks (see Milward and Wamsley 1985; Rhodes 1988; Hufen and Ringeling 1990; Marin 
and Mayentz 1991; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Marsh 1998). 
 
For instance, after an intensive quantitative study of interactions between actors in national 
policy domains in the US, Laumann and Knoke (1987) concluded that these domains consist 
of a group of core participants made up of public as well as private actors. “Despite their lack 
of formal decision-making authority, many private participants possess sufficient political 
clout to secure that their interests will be taken into account. This mutual recognition creates 
and sustains the legitimacy of core actors and their involvement in domain issues and events.  
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Within the group of core participants, however, there exists a relatively dense system of 
knowledge on inter-organizational interaction”. (Laumann and Knoke 1987: 375). 
 
Similar conclusions were reached by others including Rhodes in his analysis of British 
Government (1988), by various researchers in case studies compiled by Marsh and Rhodes 
(1992), in an analysis of decision making in the Netherlands (Koppenjan et al. 1987; Hufen 
and Ringeling 1990), and by several comparative analyses in other countries (Heisler, 1974; 
Richardson/Jordan, 1979).  In their studies, the UK researchers focused attention on the 
characteristics of the networks (tight or not, etc) and the influence of this network on 
decision-making. Marsh and Rhodes found that the existence of policy networks have 
influenced policy outcomes (Marsh/Rhodes, 1992). Rhodes work suggested that various 
forms of network can be found (differing in cohesion, interaction density and shared views for 
instance). In several cases, close relations between actors led Rhodes and colleagues to speak 
of ‘policy communities’, that is “networks characterized by stability of relationships, 
continuity of a highly restrictive membership, vertical interdependence based on shared 
service delivery, responsibility and insulation from other networks and invariability from the 
general public (including parliament). They have a high degree of vertical interdependence 
and limited horizontal articulation.  “They are highly integrated” (Rhodes 1988: 78). This 
research on policy networks and policy communities has also drawn criticism, the most 
important suggesting a) that this research still focuses on individual characteristics of the 
actors and not on characteristics of the network, and, so, b) it uses the idea of ‘network’ as a 
metaphor, and thus contributes little to earlier theories on decision-making (Dowding, 1995) 
 
Intensive interactions in sector networks can be found not only at a national level, where 
actors are strongly focused on policy making processes, but also at a local level where 
implementation of sector policy is also at stake (see Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Klijn 2001). 
Research on policy networks pays attention to a number of related topics: 
- The importance of sector culture or shared frames of meaning:  generally, actors 
within policy sectors share perceptions of the importance of the sector or 
professional norms and beliefs. Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith (1993) refer to these as 
‘policy beliefs’ and Benson (1982) as a policy paradigm. This is evident in the 
health sector (e.g. Blom-Hansen, 1998) housing (Sabatier/Jenkins, 1987; Klijn, 
2001); and law (Cope/Starie, 2002). These more or less shared perceptions of the 
field and their sedimentation as professional standards keep the network together 
and stable. 
- The closed character of these sector oriented policy networks. Research shows 
rather stable interaction patterns between actors involved in sector politics. 
Although interactions can include a variety of actors, the durable character makes 
it difficult for new actors to enter the network. They have to become familiar with 
the rules in the network and invest in relationships, so incurring high transaction 
costs. 
- The interdependency between actors in policy networks; although actors may have 
different opinions about policy aims and the division of resources, they 
nevertheless share a common interest in sector politics and the resources that result 
from that. Since they need each others’ resources, they are interdependent. 
 
Recently, there has been greater attention to policy problems that cut across sectors and this 
brings the research closer to that of the governance network tradition. 
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Service delivery and implementation networks: getting the job done 
The network literature and research on service delivery and implementation can be traced 
back directly to the early literature on inter-organisational relations of the 60s and 70s. In the 
research on inter-organisational relations there is much attention to the resource dependencies 
and the types of dependency relations which these cause (Negandhi, 1974; Rogers/Whetten, 
1982). There is also much attention for the exchange process in which actors exchange 
resources and coordinate their activities. 
 
Mapping the actors of the network through which service delivery and policy implementation 
was realised was an important activity in this research (Aldrich, 1979). The reconstruction of 
that network enabled the researcher to analyse precisely which actors were involved in 
implementation and service delivery and how these services and policies were ‘processed’ 
through the network. Research on inter-organisational coordination for the program ‘war on 
poverty’, for instance, showed that coordination was not easily achieved and competition 
between organisations frequently occurred. The researchers pictured the inter-organisational 
field as a self sustaining system in which only little cooperation exists and which was 
dominated by an ‘institutionalised thought structure’ (Warren et all, 1975). They also found, 
like much other research on inter-organisational coordination, that clear domains of 
organisations existed which resulted in frequent domain conflicts between organisations when 
they had to cooperate with each other (Warren et all, 1975; Aldrich, 1979; Pfeffer, 1981). 
 
The early implementation studies using a network perspective tried to identify the network of 
actors who were involved in implementation, they used so-called ‘backward mapping’ 
(Elmore, 1979). This “bottom–up” approach, as it was labelled, focused upon the views and 
strategies of local implementing actors about the effects of policy outcomes instead of about 
the goals and strategies of central actors (Hjern and Porter 1981; Hanf/Toonen, 1985). The 
bottom–up approach showed that central programs offer more opportunities to local 
implementing actors, but that central policy is only one of many considerations in 
implementation processes. They have been successful in highlighting the importance of other 
actors (and their perceptions and strategic choices!) in implementation processes, as well as in 
highlighting unanticipated effects of implementation. (Hjern and Porter 1981; Barrett and 
Fudge, 1981). 
 
Later research retained the interests in coordination efforts to achieve integrated services 
delivery. Most research on service delivery and service contracting shows a group of actors 
who interact intensively as a result of their dependency on delivering public integrated 
services (Milward and Provan 2000; Mandell 2001; Agranoff and McGuire 2003). In the case 
of contracting, some authors have found a tension between the need to tender the service 
delivery to acquire and maintain incentives for cost efficiency, and the need to promote 
interaction and learning processes between organizations to improve better service delivery. 
Contracting tends to disrupt the network, after which new learning and interaction processes 
are needed (Milward and Provan 2000). The expanding research into networks of actors, 
which take care of service delivery or policy implementation affirm the image of the “Hollow 
State.” The Hollow State (see Rhodes 1997; Milward and Provan 2000) refers to the image of 
a state which does not itself perform the policy making and service delivery tied to the 
modern functions of government. Instead it is charged with ensuring, by a variety of means, 
that services and policy outputs are delivered by other organizations. This feature has been 
strengthened by the recent trends towards outsourcing, privatization, and agentification that 
have been taking place over the last two decades (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). Others have 
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suggested that this hollowing out of function actually leads to a ‘congested’ State (Sullivan 
and Skelcher, 2002). 
Whether ’hollow’ or ‘congested’ there has been a weakening of the position of public actors 
who now need many ties and connections with all kind of actors to realise their policy 
objectives. In a recent study on how city officials work with other layers of government and 
organizations to develop their city economics, Agranoff and McGuire conclude that: “From 
the perspective of the city Government, there is not one cluster of linkages to manage but 
several clusters- some horizontal, some vertical, and some that include both within the context 
of a single project or program” (Agranoff and McGuire 2003: 123). Thus research on 
networks of service delivery and implementation highlight the growing complexity of these 
tasks and the need for more horizontal forms of network management.  
 
Governance networks: connecting values for societal problems 
The literature and research in the tradition of the governance network focus primarily upon 
the complexity of decision-making and the problems of reaching acceptable outcomes for 
societal problems because of the involvement of many actors.  
 
One of the first studies to use the idea of ‘network’ to analyse policy problems was the 
‘Politikverflechtung’ study of Scharpf and colleagues (Scharpf et al, 1978) into 
intergovernmental relations. For example, Scharpf researched how environmental problems 
which can not be solved by one actor alone were addressed. He use the word 
‘Politikverflechtung’ (political entanglement) for a situation which is characterized by 
dependency relations between different layers of government but which also characterized by 
a lack of central control. Pollution problems along a river, for instance, are caused at one point 
but have effects for other municipalities and regions, which lack the means to influence the 
pollution. Especially in the federative political structure of Germany, there is no coordination 
level which can solve this problem. They also show how the structure of the networks, being a 
dependency structure, the rules of the game and the normative expectations, facilitate or 
obstruct the solution of the problem. Often Scharpf is called a structuralist (see Rhodes, 1981) 
because he assumes in the study that the objective structure of the problem situation (like the 
dependency relations) require specific forms of coordination in which we can find a clear 
contingency way of thinking. 
 
Gradually more researchers have adopted the network concept to examine how complex 
decisions are being made. Especially the last 15 years the number of studies has grown 
strongly. Although research addresses many questions there is an emphasis on decisions 
which require joint actions of various actors to achieve policy measures like urban 
regeneration, community governance (Gage/Mandell, 1990; McLaverty. 2002; 
Sorenson/Torfing, 2003; Mandell (2001)), infrastructure decisions (Friend at all, 1974; Klijn, 
2001, labour market policies (Considine, 2002). Recently, studies have examined attempts by 
public actors to increase the involvement of citizens and societal groups (Papadopoulos, 2000, 
Klijn/Koppenjan, 2000; Lowndes/Pratchet/Stoker, 2001; McLaverty, 2002; Edelenbos, 2004). 
The growth of partnerships as a vehicle to organise policy making and delivery has led to 
much interest in governance network research (Osborne, 2000; Sullivan/Skelcher, 2002; 
Klijn/Teisman, 2003; Hodge/Greve, 2005). 
The following topics have been widely researched in the last 10 years: 
- how to combine different perceptions of actors and handle the problem that actors 
act and interpret them differently because of these different perceptions 
- how to organise necessary deliberation processes between actors (Forrester, 1989; 
Hayer/Wagernaar, 2003) 
 9 
- how to achieve solutions that are intellectually sound, meet actor’s interests and 
solve the different value judgements which are at stake 
- how do these deliberative processes correspond to institutions of representational 
democracy (McLaverty, 2002; Sorenson, 2002; Sorenson/Torfing 2006) 
- what is the position of public actors in these new governance networks 
(Gage/Mandell, 1990; Agranoff/McGuire, 2003);  
 
It is difficult to summarize the volume of findings, but it is possible to draw some careful 
conclusions about the findings. Again, the research tends to emphasize the need for 
governance networks to solve complex societal problems. This however can only work if 
much effort is directed at the management of these networks (Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan, 
Sorenson/Torfing, 2003). This finding is not surprising because there has been consistent 
evidence of the importance of a network manager reticulist, mediator or facilitator (Friend et 
all, 1974; Gage/Mandell, 1990; Agranov, 1986). With this strong managerial focus there is 
more in common with service delivery and implementation networks than with policy 
network research. 
 
Recent research is also concerned with how to combine governance networks processes with 
the existing institutions of representative democracy, which have a strong hierarchical way of 
steering (Sorenson/Torfing, 2003; Papadopoulos, 2000; Sullivan/Skelcher, 2002). Research 
reveals tensions between horizontal policy negotiations and the authorisation of the outcomes 
to those interactions. In particular, representative institutions are reluctant to accept the 
outcomes of the interactive process because of the threat to their authority. It also is difficult 
to involve representational institutions in the deliberation process (Edelenbos/Klijn, 2006). At 
the same time research also criticises the managerial flavour of many of the new governance 
forms which lacks attention for the democratic character (Sullivan/Skelcher 2002; 
SkelcherMathur/Smith, 2005). 
 
Conclusion: a perspective on policy and implementation 
Despite differences in research tradition, focus and research question, there are many 
similarities between the traditions discussed above. One can also see that the focus and 
questions that are raised are converging. In particular, the service delivery/implementation 
perspective and the governance network perspective share attention for the complexity of 
interactions between actors and the managerial efforts to organise networks. They are 
distinguished because governance networks explicitly focus on the question of legitimacy, 
while the service delivery/implementation perspective seems often to take this for granted.  
 
Even without the observation of convergence one can see common characteristics in the 
literature on networks originating from the different research traditions and see something like 
a common perspective.. One of the key concepts in this perspective is ‘mutual dependency’. 
As Rhodes (1988) and others, following Pfeffer (1981) have found, mutual dependencies 
emerge because actors do not themselves posses enough resources for survival or for the 
achievement of interesting goals. Thus they must interact with other organizations in order to 
exchange resources. Resources include financial resources, authority legitimacy or 
knowledge. Networks develop because these resource exchanges continue over time.  
 
Although the framework of the network perspective is strongly influenced by resource 
dependency theory it is also influenced by the literature on complex decision-making in 
Public Administration and the literature on frames and learning from organisation theory. 
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Most theoretical network perspectives on policy formation and implementation agree on at 
least the following characteristics of networks: 
- Actors and frames; policy is formed and implemented in a network of actors. 
Often a lot of different actors are present in these networks. Although these actors 
are interdependent, it is crucial to the network perspective that they are also 
conceived of as autonomous actors making their own strategic decisions. Most 
network researchers also stress that actors choose these strategies on the basis of 
their own perceptions of the world and thus have different views (frames) on 
problems and solutions (Schon/Rein, 1994). Actors can be individuals groups or 
organisations although the emphasis is on the last category. If analysis shows that 
an organisation is not the originator of the action (for instance because a ministry 
is divided in separate sections with their own interests, perceptions and strategies) 
than it should then focus upon the separate sections of an organisation 
- Interactions and complexity; as a consequence of the interdependencies and the 
variety of perceptions of the actors, network theory recognizes that complex 
interaction and negotiating patterns surround policy problems and policy 
implementation. These decision-making processes could be labelled as games 
since this conceptualizes nicely the complexity which arises out of different 
players using strategies that interact with each other to achieve outcomes. It also 
captures the notion that outcomes can be unpredictable due to the interaction of 
strategies (and changes in strategies) of separate actors. Since outcomes can only 
be achieved through cooperation (due to interdependency of resources) actors have 
to reach a minimum agreement on where to go and how to coordinate their efforts. 
Such coordination does not arrive by itself (?). 
- Institutional features; the lasting interaction between actors ensures that patterns of 
interactions and institutional features develop.The political science and 
organisation theory tradition of networks have been particularly concerned with 
adopting quantitative methods to map interactions and identify the structural 
features that arise  (Aldrich/Whetten, 19981; Lauman/Knoke, 1987; Scott, 1991). 
In addition rules are constructed through the enduring interactions of the actors 
involved, which then also guide and aid further interaction in networks (Klijn, 
2001) 
- Network management; The complexity of interactions and the different perceptions 
of actors collaboration requires guidance and managing actions, this is often 
referred to as network management (Friend, Power and Yewlett, 1974; 
Gage/Mandell, 1990; Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan, 1997; Trevillion, 1999; Meir and 
O Toole, 2001). These activities differ significantly from the usual activities 
mentioned in the organisational textbooks on intra-organisational management. 
 
The emerging network perspective on public policy making and implementation (and service 
delivery) has become popular both in the academic literature and in administrative practice. It 
is also has important consequences for our ideas about the management of policy processes. 
These are elaborated in the next section 
 
 
3. MANAGING AND STEERING NETWORKS 
 
From a network or inter-organizational perspective, policy-making and implementation is a 
complex process. Interesting outcomes for the actors involved do not occur automatically but 
have to be managed and coordinated carefully. This is in contrast to ‘conventional public 
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administration’, which strongly emphasizes political decision making and goal setting as 
important factors. Such an approach focuses primarily upon the relationship between political 
decision makers and how implementing bodies are organized (clear goal setting, strong 
monitoring and steering opportunities, etc.). Such an observation holds not only for traditional 
public administration studies but also a lot of implementation studies which implicitly take 
central goals of central (departmental) actors as a starting point for analysis (see for instance 
the classical work of Pressman and Wildavsky (1983). It is also central to more recent 
theories such as the ideas expressed in New Public Management and many contracting 
theories (see Osborne and Gaebler for the most clear example) 
 
The Public Manager as Network Manager   
Almost all the literature on networks and inter-organizational management agree that the role 
of the public manager differs significantly from portrayals in standard textbooks. These 
present the image of an identifiable organisation, with clear hierarchy and goals and well 
defined management positions (Robbins, 1980). The literature that followed the influential 
publication of Hanf and Scharpf (1978) ascribe more or less the same characteristics to the 
position and role of the so called network manager (Agranoff 1986, 2003; Agranoff and 
McGuire 2003; Friend, Power and Yewlett, 1974; Mandell 1990; Kickert, Klijn, and 
Koppenjan 1997). These include: 
 
 Power and authority. Since the network manager is dependent on the resources of 
other actors and most of the time has at best limited authority over other organizations, 
she operates in a divided power structure (Bryson and Crosby 1992). Unlike standard 
accounts of managerial authority, the network manager simply does not have the 
position and authority to make unilateral decisions. This does not mean that there are 
no power differences or that power does not matter (or give reference). From a 
network or inter-organizational perspective, the power of an actor depends on the 
range of resources available to her and the ways in which she is dependent on the 
resources of other actors (see Emerson 1962; Scharpf 1978). The more the various 
actors are mutually dependent on each other’s resources the more equal the power 
division in the network. But even powerful actors have limited authority since they 
have no direct authority regarding the way other actors use their resources. 
 Goal Structure. Activities are not guided by uniform, clear goals such as those 
ascribed to internal organisational settings, where they are often also scarce!- because 
the various actors involved have different goals. Goals also emerge during the co-
operation process (Agranoff 1986; Mandell 1990). Much of the literature on 
governance networks suggests that goal seeking constitutes a large part of decision 
and co-operation processes in networks (Forrester 1989, Mandell, 1990). It also often 
makes the goal structure of inter-organizational co-operations and decision making 
more like a ’menu’, where different actors find interesting elements that suit their 
interests and capacities, rather than a unified common goal (Koppenjan and Klijn, 
2004; Huxham and Vangen, 2005;). 
 Management Activities. In the traditional literature on management, the activities of 
the manager are described as comprising three major tasks: setting the goals 
(planning); structuring and designing the organization (organizing); and ‘getting the 
job done’ (leading) (see Robbins 1980). Network management activities are more 
focused on bringing different actors together, adjusting and accommodating goals and 
perceptions, and building organizational arrangements to sustain and strengthen 
interactions. If we were to name three network management equivalents of planning, 
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organizing, and leading, these would probably be goal finding and perception, 
accommodation, making organizational arrangements, and coordinating. 
 
In sum, the role of the manager from an inter-organizational network perspective is 
equivalent to that of a mediator, a process manager or a facilitator. This is because network 
management is in essence an inter-organizational activity (see Friend et al. 1974; Hanf and 
Scharpf 1978; Lynn 1981; Gage and Mandell 1990; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997). 
 
Strategies of Network Management 
The number of network management strategies identified in the literature is impressive and 
this is not the place to describe them (see Gage and Mandell 1990; O’Toole 1988, Agranoff 
and McGuire 2001). It is clear, however, that if the network manager is to achieve important 
outcomes a range of different strategies is required (see Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997; 
Agranoff and McGuire 2001).These include activating actors and resources, coordinating 
goal-achieving mechanisms (including influencing the perceptions and goals of other actors), 
fostering organizational arrangements to facilitate and enable interactions between actors, and 
coordinating the stream of actions and interactions between different actors. 
 
On the other hand, we have seen that networks consist of concrete interactions between actors 
within a network structure that is created by the actors (partly willingly and consciously, but 
partly as result of prior interactions and established ways of behaving). This means that 
network management strategies may be aimed at bringing about changes in the interactions of 
actors effecting changes at the network level or both (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997). 
Although making no claims to be exhaustive, Table 5.2 summarizes the main strategies of 
network management (for an overview of the many different strategies of network 
management: Hanf and Scharpf 1978; O’Toole 1988; Gage and Mandell 1990; Kickert, Klijn, 
and Koppenjan 1997; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Not all the 
strategies mentioned in any one cell are mutually exclusive. One can, for instance, influence 
the perceptions of actors by initiating a search process for variety in solutions. 
 
Strategies for the activation of actors or resources are necessary to start the game. The 
network manager has to identify the actors necessary for an initiative and actually create a 
situation in which they become interested in investing their resources (see also Lynn 1981). 
Scharpf (1978) calls this ‘selective activation’. Inter-organizational policy making requires 
correct identification of necessary participants and a lack of opposition from other actors with 
the ability to block the initiative. Conversely, the manager may wish to deactivate actors 
because their involvement is not productive. This of course also evokes normative questions, 
which are beyond the scope this chapter. Once the game has started it is necessary to clarify 
the goals and perceptions of actors and to try to invest time and money in developing 
solutions that create opportunities for actors’ participation (Koppenjan and Klijn 
2004).Creating temporary organizational arrangements to facilitate interactions is also 
important (Mulford/Rogers, 1982; Gage/Mandell, 1990). The transaction costs of these 
arrangements have to be kept as low as possible. Most of the time actors themselves 
understand this very well. Empirical research shows that despite all the talk about 
coordinating partnerships empirical research shows that organisational arrangements are often 
lacking or relatively light (Osborne, 2000; Hodge/Greve, 2005) Last but not least, the 
interactions in the game itself have to be managed. This can be done by appointing a process 
manager who invests time and energy in connecting the actions and strategies of actors 
throughout their interactions. 
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Table 5. 2 Overview of network management strategies 
 Activation of actors 
and resources 
Goal achieving 
strategies 
Organizational 
arrangements 
Interaction guiding 
Management of 
interactions 
Selective activation, 
resource mobilizing, 
stabilisation, 
deactivation of actors 
and resources, 
initiating new series of 
interaction, coalition 
building 
Searching for goal 
congruency, creating 
variation in solutions, 
influencing (and 
explicating) 
perceptions, managing 
and collecting 
information and 
research 
Creating new ad hoc 
organizational 
arrangements (boards, 
project organizations, 
etc.) 
Mediation, brokerage, 
appointing of process 
manager, removing 
obstacles to co-
operation, creating 
incentives for co-
operation 
Management of 
network 
Network activation, 
changing composition 
of networks, changing 
position of actors,  
- changing  
Reframing of 
perceptions, changing 
decision rules in 
networks, changing 
information flow 
permanently  
Creating permanent 
organizational 
constructions 
Changing or setting 
rules for conflict 
regulation, for 
information flow, 
changing pay-off rules 
or professional codes 
Adapted from Klijn, 2005 
 
At the network level, the manager also has opportunities for intervening. Contrary to 
strategies aimed at managing the interactions, which assume a given network (and its rules 
and beliefs), interventions are aimed at changing the network, mostly by changing rules in the 
network. These could be rules of entry and exit (allowing new actors to enter), rules on 
evaluation (for instance in a very classical way by changing the reward structure by means of 
subsidizing) or changing conflict rules (see for an extensive elaboration of various strategies 
Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004).   
These strategies are highly time-consuming and often more open to conflict and criticism 
because they are dangerous to established positions. They involve all kinds of normative 
questions (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Nevertheless, one can see many of these strategies in 
practice where (mostly) central public actors (like central politicians) try to achieve different 
outcomes by changing the rules for interactions, changing the positions of actors or using one 
of the other strategies that are shown in Table 5.2 
 
The effects of network management 
O’Toole and Meier did research on the effects of network management activities using data 
collected from a large number of Texas school superintendents in different educational 
districts,. Superintendents were asked how frequently they interacted with key environmental 
actors (school boards, local business leaders, other superintendents, and the state education 
agency). These frequency rankings were used to produce a measurement of network 
management and were connected to indicators of success and failure in the different 
educational networks in the districts (Meier and O’Toole 2001). They found that managerial 
networking was positively correlated with primary goals (they used standardised test scores to 
measure effectiveness), and also with other indicators of organizational performance. They 
also looked at the role of personnel stability and found that these were positively correlated to 
outcome indicators (O’Toole/Meier, 2003). They conclude: “The results of our analysis 
reconfirm the importance of management while it offers substantial support for the notion that 
personnel stability at both the managerial and the front-line level contributes positively to 
performance” (O’Toole/Meier, 2003: 61). Although Meier and O’Toole did not look at 
specific managerial strategies (such as those mentioned in Table  5.2) and thus were not able 
to assess the effect of certain types of strategies, their findings indicate that managing network 
interactions does has a positive effect on outcomes. 
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The role of public actors 
When public actors take adopt a network manager role it requires that they play a less 
dominant role than if they use top down steering. For that reason network steering has raised 
criticism that it hollows out the representational democracy and that it makes the ‘general 
interest’ ’negotiable’. It is not possible here to deal fully with this discussion but two 
observations can be made, one normative and one empirical: 
- The general interest is not without problems in modern pluriform network society. 
Complex value conflicts in most public and societal decisions mean that even 
public actors reveal different interests and opinions about what that general interest 
is. Are the positions of elected central office holders more legitimate than those of 
local elected office holders? The argument, emphasised in the network governance 
literature, is that something like a common interest is constructed during complex 
interaction processes. It is precisely this construction process which is the political 
part of the process and thereby also raises difficulties (Forrester,1989; 
Klijn/Koppenjan, 2000a; Hayer/Wagenaar, 2003); 
- Scholars and practitioners recognise that it is very difficult to form and implement 
public policy in ‘splendid isolation’ and the empirical research of the last 20 years 
clearly supports this. Whatever is though of the first argument above, the 
pragmatic argument is that networks are simply an empirical reality and that public 
actors have to deal with them anyway. 
 
Public actors can always choose not to join networks or, if they are party to it, simply use 
central top down steering mechanisms. Empirical research shows however that these 
strategies are not often (which does not mean always!) very effective. Public actors can also 
choose to represent their own interests and leave the role of network manager to someone 
else. If a public actor wants to perform the role of network manager it requires a facilitative 
role where some distance is maintained from the representation of the goals and interests of 
that actor. Such a role may also focus strongly upon securing access to the decision-making 
process of other actors (especially actors which normally do not have easy access). In that 
case the general interest is interpreted in procedural terms e.g. as securing an appropriate 
decision-making process (Klijn/Koppenjan, 2000). 
 
Managing stakeholder involvement in complex decision-making 
A substantial part of the literature on governance networks is concerned with increasing 
citizens’ involvement in policy making and decision-making (see Sorenson/Torfing, 2006). 
The supposed advantages (more citizens’ support, better outcomes and more democratic 
legitimacy) are however not always easy to achieve. Edelenbos and Klijn (2006) looked at six 
cases of so called interactive decision-making in the Netherlands. Interactive decision-making 
is a new form of governance in which public actors, in this case local municipalities, involve 
stakeholders in the formation (and implementation) of public policy. Inspired by ideas of 
network theory on process management they compared the results of these processes and 
showed that in only two of the cases unambiguously positive outcomes have been achieved in 
terms of actor contentment and enrichment. They relate the outcomes to three organisational 
variables: stakeholder participation, the relation between the interactive process and the 
position of the municipal council and last but not least network management                               
efforts (being the presence of a process design and the activity and flexibility of a network 
manager). The results show that positive outcomes in the cases are most clearly related to 
active and flexible network management while it is, surprisingly, difficult to see a link 
between outcomes and the degree to which municipal councils are involved since the 
involvement of municipal councils in general was low. The authors conclude: “. the outcomes 
 15 
seem to stress that participation is strongly appreciated by stakeholders if they see any real 
outcomes from this participation…our findings provide a good impression of the importance 
of good process management for the success of interactive processes” (Edelenbos/Klijn, 2006 
forthcoming) 
 
 
5. RESEARCHING NETWORKS: ACTOR, GAME AND NETWORK ANALYSIS 
 
If policy is made and implemented in networks, the practitioner or policy analyst needs to 
know what the characteristics of the actors are, what the network they are in looks like, and, 
last but not least, how the interaction process should or can be conducted. The assumption is 
that the institutional characteristics of the network (rules, interactions patterns) matter and 
form the conditions in which specific actors and their characteristics (their resources, their 
perceptions of the world) achieve concrete outputs (policy outcomes, services etc.) in 
interaction processes. 
 
Three types of analysis 
For a full understanding of the policy processes and their outcomes we need to combine three 
types of analysis (Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004): 
- Actor analysis; Actors are the basic units of analysis because they are the source 
from which actions originate. Important analytical steps are the identification of 
the important actors and the reconstruction of their perceptions on important topics 
such as the nature of the problem, the desired solutions or their views on other 
actors. After all the assumption in most network theories on policy making and 
implementation is that these perceptions or frames inform and inspire the choice of 
strategies of actors (see also Schon/Rein, 1994; Huxham/Vangen, 2005).  It is also 
important to get a picture of the resources of each actor and the dependency 
relations (see also chapter 14) which result from the resource distribution between 
the actors. 
- Game analysis; Policy outcomes and policy implementation in the network 
perspective are a result of the complex interaction of various actors’ strategies. In 
more complex policy problems these interactions often take place in different 
arenas, thereby enhancing the complexity of the decision-making process. These 
decision-making processes, which are called games, have to be analysed to know 
what is happening and why. Although many steps in this analysis can be isolated 
(like identifying actors’ strategies, crucial decisions and external events), 
highlighting two important steps illustrates the complexity of the process and its 
character. These steps are determining relevant arenas, and identifying and 
analysing stagnations. Determining the arenas requires identifying the groups of 
actors and interaction situations that are relevant for the policy decision or 
implementation process under study. For the practitioner this gives him/her a 
flavour of the complexity of the game and a hint about where he/she should be 
present to influence or even manage the game. For the analysts is makes clear how 
the outcomes are influenced by various decisions taken at various places. 
Identifying stagnations in the process (and assessing the influence of actors 
strategies on that) assists in knowing where to start if you want to improve the 
decision-making process (the practitioner). When decision-making accelerates or 
dies off it also aids in knowing the consequences of this for achieving outcomes 
(analyst) 
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- Network analysis; Getting a picture of the network and its characteristics is central 
to the assessment of the influence of institutional characteristics upon the decision-
making process. There are several analytical steps, which can be important in this 
respect. Mapping the interaction patterns through social network analysis 
techniques is a very classical way to get an image of the central and peripheral 
actors in the networks and, which actors are connected to each other. Of course the 
demarcation problem (what are the borders of the network) is always difficult. One 
can look at the frequency of interactions to decide where to cut of the network, or 
ask the respondents directly for their opinion about who is in the network or not. 
This is a decision for the researcher who should keep the analytical value of 
different techniques and their relevance in mind. Looking at ties that seem to exist 
between actors in different networks is useful when analysing links between 
networks. There are several established statistical packages to analyse networks 
and their interactions (Scott, 1991) with even the regular SPPS packages offering 
possibilities to analyse interaction patterns nowadays (see for more information 
chapter12). One can also use Multi Dimensional Scaling. This frequently used 
technique for network analysis calculates distances between actors in a network on 
the basis of interactions matrices that contain information about the interactions of 
each actor with the other actors. A complex diagram is presented in two 
dimensions and identifies which actors with the same pattern of interaction find 
themselves close to each other (see Scott, 1991. The same procedure can be used 
in analyzing perceptions (mapping them or making a MDS analysis). These are 
measured by asking the actors involved to respond to explicit statements. Mapping 
interaction however does not give the analyst more (which is still very valuable!) 
information than the interaction pattern at a certain moment in time. It does not tell 
much about the structure of the network or rather the rules that guide actors’ 
behaviour and construct their meaning (Giddens, 1984). The reconstruction of 
formal rules is not very difficult and only requires close reading of the official 
texts (laws, regulations etc). The reconstruction of informal rules however is far 
more laborious. It requires the in-depth interviewing of actors involved, as well as 
confronting the findings with one another other (Klijn, 2001). It can however be a 
very satisfactory since it is capable of revealing the kinds of rules that actors 
establish within processes such as rules about profession, about the entry of actors 
in the network and about the exchange of information, to name a few examples 
(See Ostrom, 1986; Burns/Flam, 1987; Klijn, 2001). 
 
Table 5.3 provides an overview of a various analytical steps in the actor, the game and the 
network analysis. 
 
Table 5.3 Steps in Actors, Game and Network Analysis 
Step Intention Important Questions 
Actor Analysis 
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Take a provisional 
formulation of a problem 
or initiative as starting 
point 
Mapping a problem situation or 
initiative as starting point for further 
analysis 
- What does the current or expected situation look like? 
- What are the (undesirable) consequences that flow 
from that? 
- What are regarded as the causes for this situation? 
- What is the desired situation? 
- What goals and criteria underlie this? 
- Which solutions / policy alternatives are pursued? 
Identify actors involved Which actors need to be taken into 
account 
- Who can be distinguished as the acting units? 
- Which actors in the network are important to realizing 
one’s own objectives or policy goals? 
- Which actors have an interest in finding a solution to 
the problem situation? 
Reconstruct perceptions 
of actors 
Mapping images of actors with regard 
to the problem, the solution, and other 
actors 
- what images do actors hold about aspects such as 
problem, causes, solutions and (competency) of each 
other? 
- to what degree do these perceptions differ, are there 
clear groups? 
- What obstacles could be caused by differences in 
perception? 
Analyze actor positions 
and dependencies 
What positions do actors take with 
regard to the problem situation and 
how much do actors depend upon each 
other 
- what means do different actors have at their disposal? 
- how important are these means and can they be 
acquired elsewhere? 
- is there unilateral or mutual dependency? 
- are actors critical, dedicated and/or comparable? 
Game Analysis 
Determine the relevant 
arenas 
Acknowledging coherent groups of 
actors and interaction situations around 
demarcated policy issues and/or 
initiatives that are meaningful to the 
initial initiative or policy game 
- where are the decisions made that are important to the 
initiative/policy game that is analyzed? 
- which actors interact in which context (sector, policy 
content, ad hoc etc.) 
- how coherent are these groups of actors? 
- do these groups of actors have relations with each 
other (linkages)? 
Identify and analyze 
stagnation 
Inventory stagnation in the game and 
determine the nature and structure of 
stagnation as a starting point for 
managing interventions 
- is there stagnation in the game? 
- what is the nature and structure of stagnation? 
- which players are involved in the stagnation? 
- are these blockades or stagnation? 
- to what extent is the stagnation cognitive by nature? 
- to what extent is the stagnation social by nature? 
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Network Analysis 
Inventory of interaction 
patterns of actors 
Through mapping the frequency and 
diversity of interactions of actors, 
networks and the actors who belong to 
them can be determined 
- which actors interact frequently and which 
infrequently? 
- which actors have a varying contact pattern and which 
do not? 
- which actors are central and peripheral in the network 
given their contact pattern? 
Inventory of patterns in 
actors’ perception 
By determining the relation in 
perceptions among actors, one can 
discover which networks actor belong 
to 
- what perceptions do actors hold with regard to 
problems, solutions, and their environment? 
- to what degree do these perceptions correspond to 
those of other actors? 
Inventory of institutional 
provisions that connect 
actors in networks 
Make an inventory of and analyze the 
formal and informal rules of the game 
and other organizational arrangements 
in the network relevant to the policy 
game 
- what formal rules and juridical procedures apply? 
- what informal rules can be distinguished (for instance, 
with regard to information provision, access 
opportunities, professional codes etc.)? 
- what meeting and consultation procedures or other 
organizational constructions exist in the network that 
structure the policy game? 
Adapted from: Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004 
 
Handling the analytical steps 
It is of course not always necessary to perform all the analytical steps described in table 5.3. 
In many cases the analyst can restrict himself/herself to some of the steps or even pick out 
several elements of the steps. This could be connected to the type of problems one is facing or 
the needs of the actors in the network. Each of the steps can also be performed extensively in 
a scientific manner or very loosely. 
 
Another problem is that the dynamics in most networks are intense and situations change. 
This probably means that (parts of) the analysis has to be repeated over time. This is also a 
strategic decision, in which the costs of analysis have to be weighed against the gains. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION: FUTURE FOR A NETWORK PERSPECTIVE ON POLICY 
 
It can be concluded that the network perspective offers an interesting and promising 
theoretical perspective. It has generated a lot of empirical material on the complexity of policy 
making and implementation processes, on the need for extensive ‘horizontal’ and unorthodox 
forms of management. Recent research also indicates that in order to achieve important policy 
outcomes and (integrated) service delivery, public actors often need more than one network 
(Agranoff/McGuire, 2003), which make their managerial tasks even more complicated. 
Further development is certainly needed. Several authors have criticized network theory 
because most of the variables seemed to be on the actor level rather than on the network level 
(Dowding, 1995; Pollitt, 2003ba). This is not entirely correct since there is research which 
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considers network characteristics (either the pattern of relations or the constructed rules). 
Nevertheless there is no doubt that the influence of network characteristics and how to 
analyse them requires more sustained theoretical and methodological attention.  
 
In addition, more research is needed to investigate the way that the institutional features of 
different networks clash since the many policy initiatives nowadays require the involvement 
of different networks. Last, but certainly not least, more attention needs to be devoted to the 
relationship between horizontal forms of managing and the problem of accountability in 
networks. The key question – both theoretical and practical - to be answered by network 
researchers is: how can accountability be arranged or, more likely, rearranged so that it ties in 
with and addresses the problem of the empirically complex world of networks? This is a 
world in which resources are dispersed, actors have opportunities to block decisions and 
societal problems can only be solved by the involvement of a large group of actors. A final 
related question concerns the democratic basis of policy network management: how may 
citizens be involved in such complex decision-making processes and how may they be tied to 
the “traditional” institutions of parliamentary democracy?  
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